
# Investigating Large Scale HTTPS Interception in Kazakhstan

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University of Michigan, \*Independent, #University of Colorado Boulder



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четверг, Сегодня

Уважаемый абонент! В соответствии с Законом «О связи» ст.26 для доступа к Интернету Вам необходимо установить сертификат безопасности http://gca.kz/. Просим Вас произвести установку на каждое абонентское устройство, имеющее выход в Интернет (смартфон, планшет, ноутбук и т.д). Отсутствие сертификата безопасности на устройстве приведет к проблемам с доступом к отдельным Интернет-ресурсам. Ваш Tele2

ците сообщение

Dear subscriber! You have to install a Security Certificate from http://qca.kz/ to access the Internet according to article no. 26 of the Law "On Communications". We ask you to perform the installation on every subscriber's device connected to the Internet (smartphone, tablet, laptop, etc.) The lack of the Security Certificate being installed on the device will lead to problems while accessing certain Internet resources. Yours, Tele2.

Source: https://i.imgur.com/WyKjOug.jpg

# Kazakhstan, July 17, 2019

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
<mark>m</mark> Bugzilla	<b>Q</b> Search Bugs	Browse	Q Advanced Search	»	New Account	Log In	Forgot Pa	issword
						Copy Su	immary	View <del>•</del>
	114 Opened 1 year ago Closed 1 year ago TTPS traffic in Kazakhstan							
Product: NSS Component: CA	; • Certificate Root Program •		Type: 🧔 defi Priority: P1 S		al			
+ Tracking								
Status: RES	OLVED FIXED							

Source: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\_bug.cgi?id=1567114

	Groups	۹	Conversations	•	Search conversations within mozilla.dev.secu	4
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	All groups		Paul Wouters			
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mozi	illa.dev.security.policy	•	On 1/6/16 3:07 PM, Pau	l Wouters w	ote: > > As was in the news before, Kazakhstan has issued a	

Source: https://groups.google.com/g/mozilla.dev.security.policy/c/wnuKAhACo3E/m/cpsvHgcuDwAJ

#### Increasing HTTPS adoption - A safer (and more private) Internet



#### DigiNotar: Iranians - The Real Target

Posted on: September 5, 2011 at 4:57 am Posted in: Bad Sites, Targeted Attacks Author: Feike Hacquebord (Senior Threat Researcher)

#### () 🖸 🕤 🖾

In this blog post, we present concrete evidence that the recent compromise of Dutch certification authority *DigiNotar* was used to spy on Iranian Internet users on a large scale.

We found that Internet users in more than 40 different networks of ISPs and universities in Iran were met with rogue SSL certificates issued by *DigiNotar*. Even worse, we found evidence that some Iranians who used software designed to circumvent traffic censorship and snooping were not protected against the massive man-in-the-middle attack.



About Issues Our Work Take Action

#### A Syrian Man-In-The-Middle Attack against Facebook

TECHNICAL ANALYSIS BY PETER ECKERSLEY MAY 5, 2011

HTTPS presents challenges for mass surveillance and keyword-based censorship

# Advances in technology

- Sophisticated (and more accessible) middleboxes
  - SSL decryption
  - Large number of users
- Investment in Government surveillance technology



Kazakhstan	22
NOT FREE	/10
A. Obstacles to Access	<b>10</b> /25
B. Limits on Content	<b>11</b> /35
C. Violations of User Rights	<b>11</b> /40

Source: https://freedomhouse.org/country/kazakhstan/freedom-net/2019

# Kazakhstan Internet

## Freedom

m	Bugzilla	<b>Q</b> Search Bugs	Browse	<b>Q</b> Advanced Search	»	New Account	Log In Forg	ot Password
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Clos Add	_	i89 Opened 5 years ago Closed 4 years ago	olic of Kaza	akhstan (root.gov	ı.kz)			
▼ Cate	gories							
Co	Product: NSS mponent: CA C	▼ ertificate Root Program ▼		Type: 盲 task Priority: Not set		normal		

Source: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\_bug.cgi?id=1232689

# Kazakhstan root CA - November 2015

# Kazakhstan's National TLS Interception

- July 17, 2019 : Government started intercepting large fraction of HTTPS traffic within its borders.
- Facebook and Google among domains affected

→ C kcell.kz/en/product/trust-certific...



#### What is 'Security Certificate'?


Security Certificate — digital certificate software designed to protect the Internet users from content that is prohibited by the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan, as well as from malicious and potentially dangerous content. The security certificate is intended to provide the users of mobile services in Kazakhstan access to the Internet access in the most secure manner.

Why do I need to install Security Certificate?

The security certificate will allow you to protect yourself from online fraudsters, hacker attacks and illegal content on the Internet. This is required under Kazakhstan law. The law On Communication and clause 11 of Rules for Issuing and Applying Security Certificates prescribe that telecom network operators are to ensure that customers with whom the operators have service contracts install the security certificate on their mobile devices.

# Detecting the interception

and learning what triggers it



# **Detecting the interception - 2 VPSes**



# **Detecting the interception - 2 VPSes**




# **Detecting the interception - 2 VPSes - No interception**



# **Detecting the interception - 52 RIPE Atlas**




# Detecting the interception – 52 RIPE Atlas – 2 RIPE Atlas probe observed interception




# Detecting the interception - 52 RIPE Atlas - 2 RIPE Atlas probe observed interception

Issuer: C = KZ, CN = Qaznet Trust Network



# Detecting the interception – 52 RIPE Atlas – 2 RIPE Atlas probe observed interception


# **Detecting the interception - Hyperquack**<sup>[1,2]</sup>




[1] Measuring the Deployment of Network Censorship Filters at Global Scale, NDSS 2020

[2] https://censoredplanet.org/projects/hyperquack


#### How Hyperquack works




#### How Hyperquack works



#### How Hyperquack works





#### Step 3: detection




Compare step 1 and 2

If HTTP response bodies are NOT the same: output=Disrupted

If HTTP response bodies are the same but certificates are NOT the same: output=MITM TLS

If HTTP response bodies and certificates are the same: output=Not blocked



#### **Detecting the interception - Hyperquack - 82 VPs in 21 ASes** [1]


http://s3.amazonaws.com/alexa-static/top-1m.csv.zip

[2] https://github.com/citizenlab/test-lists

## **Results from Hyperquack**

- 6 of 82 (7.32%) vantage points observed the interception
- All 6 vantage points in AS 9198 (Kazakhtelecom), located in Nur-Sultan
- 27 domains, mainly social media and communications, affected
- Interception can be triggered bidirectionally

#### How the interception works




## **Conditions for triggering interception**


- Traffic must pass through a particular part of AS 9198 (Kazakhtelecom)
- TLS SNI extension should contain affected domains
- Server must present a valid browser-trusted TLS certificate, but not necessarily a certificate for the domain

# In-depth measurements

How and where does the interception occur?




## Measurements to 6,736 TLS hosts in 85 ASes



- 1. Test for interception to google.com and facebook.com
- 2. On affected servers, test Alexa Top 10,000 domains
- 3. Keep measurements running

## Measurements to 6,736 TLS hosts in 85 ASes



# **TTL-limited measurements**

# Results

from our in-depth measurements

## **Extent of the Interception**

- (From University of Michigan) **459 of 6,736 (7%)** TLS hosts observed injected certificate
- (From Kazakhstan VPS) **1,598 of 6,736 (24%)** TLS hosts observed injected certificate
- Paths to all TLS hosts observing interception passed through AS 9198 (Kazakhtelecom)

AS	Name	# TLS hosts		
9198	JSC Kazakhtelecom	385		
29555	Mobile Telecom-Service LLP	32		
48502	ForteBank JSC	23		
43601	JSC BankCenterCredit	9		
50482	JSC Kazakhtelecom	7		
60708	KazNIC Organization	2		
43934	Interbank Settlement Centre	1		

# ASes of hosts exhibiting interception

# **Location of Interception**

- Interception occurred only three or four network hops before host
- 95% of the time:
  - Hop before injection 92.47.151.210 or 92.47.150.19
  - Hop after injection 95.56.243.92 or 95.59.170.5
- All IPs belong to AS 9198 (Kazakhtelecom)

1	1 185.120.76.1
1	2 88.204.195.89
1	3 212.154.195.97
!	4 92.47.151.210
!	5 95.56.243.92
1	6 178.89.110.198
1	7 178.89.110.206
1	8

#### **Custom certificate**

- Same Subject and Subject Alternative Name (SAN) as the original host's certificate
- The Public Key replaced with a host-specific RSA-2048 key (until July 19, 1024 bit), with exponent 3
- The validity period (Not Before/Not After) is the same as the original certificate's but shifted exactly 6 hours in the past This changed to 24 hours validity on July 30

# **Censor's TLS fingerprint**

- Sent RIPE Atlas measurement to our server with SNI facebook.com
- Fingerprint virtually unseen in normal Internet traffic, can be used to fingerprint and identify the MitM

#### f09427b5aaf9304b

Seen	(all time) (past week)	< 100 times (0.00%) < 100 times (0.00%)	
Rank	(all time) (past week)	41383 / 574811 -1 / 19001	
TLS Versi	on	TLS 1.0	
Handshal	ce Version	TLS 1.2	


Source: https://tlsfingerprint.io/id/f09427b5aaf9304b

# **Domains Targeted - 37**

Company	Domains
Google	allo.google.com, android.com, dns.google.com, docs.google.com, encrypted.google.com, goo.gl, google.com, groups.google.com, hangouts.google.com, mail.google.com, messages.android.com, news.google.com, picasa.google.com, plus.google.com, sites.google.com, translate.google.com, video.google.com, www.google.com, www.youtube.com, youtube.com
Facebook	cdninstagram.com, facebook.com, instagram.com, messenger.com, www.facebook.com, www.instagram.com, www.messenger.com
Mail.Ru	mail.ru, ok.ru, tamtam.chat, vk.com, vk.me, vkuseraudio.net, vkuservideo.net
Others	rukoeb.com, sosalkino.tv, twitter.com

# "Security Certificate"

But this list of domains suggests that the actual intention is instead to surveil users on social networking and communication sites



### Longitudinal tracking



# **Pilot testing** completed...for now

"...the National Security Committee has successfully completed testing the application of the security certificate."

"The application of the security certificate in the future will be carried out in the event of a threat to national security.....

What happened to collected data??



Главная / Новости / В отношении сертификата безопасности

#### В отношении сертификата безопасности

🚌 Напечатать страницу

KA3 PVC EN

контакты

В соответствии с Законом Республики Казахстан «О национальной безопасности Республики Казахстан» и в целях обеспечения информационной и кибербезопасности, Комитетом национальной безопасности успешно завершено тестирование применения сертификата безопасности.

В результате создана система по предотвращению киберугроз как в кибер, так и информационном пространстве.

Национальным координационным центром информационной безопасности только за истекший месяц. выявлено более 8 млн. фактов вирусной активности и 130 тыс. кибератак в отношении государственных органов и частных компаний, выявлены факты кибершпионажа в отношении ряда государственных органов

Наряду с этим, изучены проблемные вопросы, связанные с внедрением сертификата, а также оказанием влияния на работу сетей операторов связи.

Применение сертификата безопасности в дальнейшем будет осуществляться при возникновении угрозы национальной безопасности в виде кибер и информационных атак, с предварительным уведомлением граждан Республики Казахстан

С учетом полученных положительных результатов тестирования, КНБ информирует о прекращении

тестирования с 7 августа т.г. В ближайшее время на официальном сайте будут размещены инструкции по удалению сертификата безопасности с личных устройств. Комитет национальной безопасности уведомляет о необходимости соблюдения законодательства Республики Казахстан по хранению персональных данных граждан на территории страны и выполнению требований уполномоченных органов по удалению противозаконной информации.

06.08.2019

Source: http://knb.gov.kz/ru/news/v-otnoshenii-sertifikata-bezopasnosti



#### What does this mean for users in Kazakhstan?

#### Installed the custom cert?

- Complete visibility
- User credentials, sensitive information
- Ability to modify traffic and selectively block

#### Haven't installed the custom cert?

- Security warnings for all website access
- Access blocked if HSTS is enabled



# Browsers Take a Stand Against Interception

The use of 'Qaznet Trust Network' root CA certificate in Chrome, Firefox, and Safari is now prevented

### Implications

- Limitations of HTTPS
  - Previous state-sponsored interception attacks required compromising a CA
- Users Trust the certificate or be blocked
- Dangerous precedent for other countries



# What to do in the future?

- Quicker response from browsers
- Non-intrusive visual indicators when custom certificates are used
- Further research into MitM defenses
- Rapid measurements to detect and study attacks





# censoredplanet.org/kazakhstan

